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ABSTRACT
The positive influence of subsidies on merchandise exports is well
known from international trade theory literature. However, the empirical
evidence on the relationship itself remains ambiguous. This article fills
a gap in the existing pool of research by conducting a panel data empirical
analysis over two decades for 140 countries to understand the relationship
between their overall budgetary subsidies and aggregate merchandise
export inclination. The detailed research findings of this paper underline
the importance of going beyond the "Bali Package" agreed in December
2013 and concluding the Doha Round Negotiations of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). The outline for the Bali agreement was that the
Members of the WTO would exercise utmost restraint in using any form
of export subsidy. Because of this inability to reach binding decisions,
the Bali agreement is open ended and relies on good will and restraint.
Fundamentally, this article stresses the positive impact of disciplining
subsidies in particular in no uncertain terms. The results of this article
lead to two important conclusions. First, the economic analysis shows
that developing countries should realize that a subsidy-based trade war is
more likely to put them in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the WTO
developed members; and second, the legal analysis shows that the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM")
requires urgent clarification in the negotiating tables to ensure the global
economy does not suffer major turbulences in the coming years.

I. INTRODUCTION

The objective of establishing the World Trade Organization
("WTO") in 1995 has been to enhance international trade flows through
elimination or reduction of various unfair trade practices. While the
WTO negotiations have been able to phase out the traditional trade
barriers like import quotas and have been broadly successful in reducing
the tariff barriers, limiting the trade distortions arising from subsidies still
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remains an area of concern. 1 The situation before the Ninth Ministerial
Conference2 did not look promising. 3 "[A] number of countries opposed
any legally binding decision in Bali, including lower limits on export
subsidies. " 4 The outline for the Bali agreement was that WTO countries
would "'exercise utmost restraint' in using any form of export subsidy." 5
"Because of this inability to reach binding decisions, the Bali agreement
is open ended and relies on good will and restraint." 6 "In all, the
agricultural package in the Bali agreement has moved the stakes on very
little."7 "With no legally binding arrangements, the [gray areas in the]
goodwill statements are open to abuse and the disputes' panel of the
1. To offset price advantages of imported products, states make specific monetary
payments or provide tax relief to domestic producers, allowing them to lower domestic or
export prices and obtain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis competing foreign products.
Subsidies exist in different forms (export subsidies, domestic subsidies, production subsidies
or decoupled subsidies [direct payments]). Subsidies are specific and different from general
payments, such as social security to which the public at large or large segments of the
population are entitled. See generally M.C.E.J. BRONCKERS, SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD
MEASURES IN MULTILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS: ISSUES OF PROTECTIONISM IN GATT
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED STATES LAW (1985); T. Josling & S. Tangermann,

Production and Export Subsidies in Agriculture: Lessons from GA TT and WTP Disputes
Involving the us and the EC, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES: THE EU, THE us, AND
THE WTO 207 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003); James Rude, Under
the Green Box: The WTO and Farm Subsidies, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1015 (2001).
2. The WTO Ninth Ministerial Conference was held in Bali, Indonesia, from the 3rdto
the 6th of December 2013. See Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013, WORLD TRADE
ORO.,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto _ e/minist_e/mc9 _ el
bali_texts_combined_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2014)[hereinafter Bali Declaration]; see
generally Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO 's Supremacy in the

International Trade Order - A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT'L ECON. L. 9 (2013); Julien Chaisse, Compliance with
International Law as a Process- Deconstructing the Obligation ofConformity, 38 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
3. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, DAIRYVIETNAMCO., LTD., available at
http://www.dairyvietnam.com. vn/en/News/World-Trade-Organisation-Truly-Delivers.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014). "In May, the G- 20 group of developing countries had called on
developed countries to [reduce in halfJ their ceilings on the money they spend on export
subsidies by the end of 2013 and phase in a 540-day limit in the repayment period for export
credit." Id. "The final target is 180 days." Id. "The G-20 also called for a limit on the
quantities of subsidized exports, at the average actually exported with subsidies for 20032005 ." Id.
4. "The United States in particular wanted to grant this exception on a temporary basis
only." Christian lgnatzi, WTO Bali Agreement Expected to Boost Growth, DW (July 12,
2013), available at http://www.dw.de/wto-bali-agreement-expected-to-boost-growth/al 7278088 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). Also, "India wanted to make sure that food would
remain affordable for its poor population of 800 million and therefore had insisted on
permission to subsidize rice and grain." Id.
5. See generally Bali Declaration, supra note 2.
6. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, supra note 3.
7. Id.
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[WTO] could be just as busy as it has been with countries arguing over
subsidies and tariffs and quotas as much as they have over the last [two
decades.]" 8
The present analysis contributes to the understanding of the
relationship between overall government financial transfers (i.e.,
budgetary subsidies) and aggregate merchandise exports as a percentage
of gross domestic product ("GDP") in two ways. First, it shows that the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM")
requires clarification in the negotiating tables. Second, developing
countries should realize that a subsidy-based trade war is more likely to
put them in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the developed WTO
members.
Provision of subsidies to local players can be explained by several
underlying motivations from the standpoint of national governments,
namely, industrial development, facilitating innovation, supporting
national champions, securing environment-related objectives, ensuring
redistribution, etc. 9 The subsidies can be provided to the local players
through interventions both in the input as well as output markets. The
efficacy of subsidy policy as a strategic trade instrument is however
crucially linked with the local industry's learning capability and the
extent to which the domestic and foreign goods are substitutable. 10 The
trade theoretic literature notes that in a scenario characterized by fast
capital mobility, imposition of import tariffs leads to better welfare
implication as compared to export subsidies. 11 Nevertheless, presence of
domestic distortions in lower income countries result to frequent
deployment of subsidy measures to further long-term goals, as they
function as more efficient trade policy instrument vis-a-vis import
tariffs. 12
8. Id.
9. See Terry Collins-Williams & Gerry Salembier, International Disciplines on
Subsidies: The GATT, the WTO and the Future Agenda, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1996); see
also Simon Lester, The Problem OfSubsidies as a Means of Protectionism: Lessons From the
WTO EC-Aircraft Case, 12 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2013).
10. See Marc J. Melitz, When and How Should Infant Industries be Protected?, 66 J.
INT'L ECON. 177 (2005); Kym Anderson, Subsidies and Trade Barriers (paper presented at a
roundtable in Copenhagen on 24-28 May 2004, as a part of the Copenhagen Consensus
project)
available
at
http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/cptradefinished.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
11. See Tanapong Potipiti, Import Tariffs and Export Subsidies in the World Trade
Organization: A Small - Country Approach (ARTNeT Working Paper No. 119, Bangkok,
ESCAP,
2012),
available
at
http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/AWP%20No.%20119 .pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
12. See generally Jagdish Bhagwati & V. K. Ramaswami, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs
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Apart from the aforesaid determinants, promoting exports of
domestic players who are in competition with their foreign counterparts
in the global market is a major driving motive for providing subsidies. 13
The standard trade analysis observes that the subsidies provided by
national governments enable the domestic producers suffering from cost
disadvantage to sell their products in the international markets at a
relatively cheaper price, thereby resulting in a rise in their exports. 14 The
theoretical relationship between subsidies and exports is clearly
observed, irrespective of market structure, as the policy is capable of
delivering both in the presence of competitive, as well as oligopolistic,
markets. 15 Several export subsidy programs are operational in European
countries and the U.S., which provide their firms greater advantage visa-vis their foreign competitors. 16 The adoption of export subsidies as a
strategic policy instrument has been reported extensively in the
literature. 17 For instance, production and export subsidies in a home
country may motivate multinational corporations from abroad to locate
production facilities there. 18
The trade-distorting effects of subsidies in general, and export
subsidies in particular, are widely acknowledged to be in conflict with
core WTO principle of fair trade. The mandate of the ongoing WTO
negotiations under the Agreement of Agriculture ("AoA") and the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM") are to
ensure better discipline on both direct (e.g. direct payment) as well as
indirect (e.g. revenue foregone by preferential electricity and fuel price,
lowered interest payment on restructured loans) financial transfers. 19 As
and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44-50 (1963).
13. See generally Gary N. Horlick, A Personal History ofthe WTO Subsidies Agreement,
47 J. WORLD TRADE 447 (2013); see also James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, Export
Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry, 18 J. INT'L ECON. 83 (1985).
14. See generally Horlick, supra note 13; see also Brander & Spencer, supra note 13.
15. See Cees van Beers, Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh, Andre de Moor & Frans
Oosterhuis, Determining the Environmental Effects of Indirect Subsidies: Integrated Method
and Application to the Netherlands, 39 APPLIED ECON. 2465 (2007); see also Avinash Dixit,
International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries, 94 ECON . J. 1 (1984).
16. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE, NATIONAL TRADE POLICY FOR EXPORT SUCCESS,
U .N. Doc. P248.E/DCP/BTP/11-XI, U.N. Sales No. E.12.III.T.3 (2011).
17. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and
Agricultural Trade Disputes, 13 ECON. & POL. 113 (2001); see also Andrew Y. Lemon, The
Peril of Implementing Export Subsidies in the Presence of Special Interests (Feb. 21, 2003)
(preliminary draft) (on file with the Yale University Department of Economics), available at
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Workshops-Seminars/IndustrialOrganization/lemon-030225.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
18. See generally Davin Chor, Subsidies for FD!: Implications from a Model with
Heterogeneous Firms, 78 J. INT'L ECON. 113 (2009).
19. See generally Legal Texts: A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,
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per AoA and ASCM provisions, subsidies are classified under two broad
categories, namely, actionable (i.e. subsidies which are directly linked
with production and hence trade-distorting) and non-actionable (i.e.
subsidies which are not directly linked with production and hence have
lesser impact on trade). The goal of the current WTO negotiations is to
limit the actionable subsidies 20 ( e.g. certain forms of fisheries subsides,
amber and blue box subsidies in agriculture) and discontinuation of all
forms of agricultural export subsidies. 21 While the Doha Development
Agenda ("DDA") negotiations have been broadly successful in reforming
the export subsidies scenario, the prevalence of domestic subsidies in
several member countries remains a major concern area. 22
In this context, the present analysis intends to contribute to the
literature by exploring the relationship between government financial
transfers (i.e., budgetary subsidies) and merchandise exports as a
percentage of GDP in a cross-country framework. The aim is to provide
some policy recommendations (or at least orientation) which could guide
current negotiations for the benefit of all WTO members.
The paper is arranged along the following lines. First, a brief
discussion on the research frontier on subsidies and their potential
implications on exports is conducted. Secondly, the reflection of this
understanding in the regulatory context provided by the WTO' s
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM") is
analyzed in its key dimensions. Third, the data sources are explained and
macro trends of the principal variables are illustrated. A cross-country
empirical analysis is undertaken next for understanding the influence of
budgetary subsidies on export inclination. Finally on the basis of the
empirical results, a few policy conclusions are drawn.

WORLD
TRADE
ORO.,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#kAgreement (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
20. See generally Debashis Chakraborty, Julien Chaisse & Animesh Kumar, Doha

Round Negotiations on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures: Potential Implications on
Trade Flows in Fishery Sector, 6 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL. 201, 201-34
(2011).
21.

See Ian F. Fergusson, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha
Development Agenda, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2011).
22. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures , (U. Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 186, 2003), available
at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/186.aos_.subsidies.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014); see also Julien Chaisse & Puneeth Nagaraj, Changing Lanes: Trade, Investment and
Intellectual Property Rights, 37 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 223-70 (2014).
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IL UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF WTO RULES ON
SUBSIDIES
Although subsidies specifically geared towards export promotion
contribute more in boosting exports, even domestic subsidies may cause
over-production and lead to enhanced exports for releasing the downward
pressure on prices in domestic market. The positive relationship between
subsidies and exports is observed both in case of agricultural and
manufacturing sectors.
A. The Agricultural Sector

Agricultural export subsidies have emerged as a major policy
instrument adopted in both developed and developing countries during
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") period and WTO
days. Both agricultural input subsidies (e.g. fertilizer subsidy, irrigation
subsidy in terms of free electricity) and output subsidies (e.g. per unit
support at higher than market price) may lead to over-production, thereby
fueling export opportunities. 23
Agricultural export subsidies have been extensively used in the U.S.
during pre-WTO days. In 1993, the payments under the Export
Enhancement Program ("EEP") crossed U.S. $1 billion. 24 The support to
U.S. players in terms of export credit arrangements, including deferred
interest payments, government guarantees for securing loans at lower
interest rates, etc. have also played crucial roles. 25 Similarly in the EU,
the primary sector (e.g. dairy and poultry sector) received export
subsidies in the order of€ 1 billion and €650 million in 2008 and 2009
respectively through the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"). 26 It has
been noted that developing countries like Brazil, India, Mexico, South
Africa, Thailand, Venezuela, etc. also provide considerable volume of
agricultural subsidies. 27

23 . See generally Sacchidananda Mukherjee & Debashis Chakraborty, Relationship
Between Fiscal Subsidies and C02 Emissions: Evidence from Cross-Country Empirical
Estimates, ECON. RES. INT'L, Vol. 2014 (2014).
24. See Howard D. Leathers, Agricultural Export Subsidies as a Tool of Trade Strategy:
Before and After the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 83 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 209 (2001).
25. See generally James Rude, Reform ofAgricultural Export Credit Programs, 1 ESTEY
CTR. J. lNT'L L. & TRADE POL. 66 (2000).
26. See Dirk Willem te Velde et al., The EU's Common Agricultural Policy and
Development, 79 OVERSEAS DEV. INST. PROJECT BRIEFINGS 1, 3 (2012).
27. See Arvind Panagariya, Agricultural Liberalisation and the Least Developed
Countries: Six Fallacies, 28 WORLD ECON. 1277, 1285 (2005).
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B. The Industrial Sector
The subsidies given to the industrial sector and their implications for
exports constitute another major branch of literature. The positive
influence of government subsidies in Japan for promotion of progressive
industries and exports deserves mention. 28 Apart from the direct
subsidies, indirect subsidies like fuel subsidies can significantly lower the
variable cost of production in capital-intensive sectors like iron and steel
etc., which also provide them substantial edge in the export markets over
competitors. 29 Incidence of high volume of fuel subsidies both in
developed30 and emerging countries31 and their potential export
implications has been reported in the literature.

C. The Positive Relationship as Classic Analysis
The literature on the subsidy-export interrelationship in developed
countries has generally showed a positive relationship between the two.
Agricultural export subsidies have significantly boosted exports from the
recipient countries. 32 The evidence of subsidized wheat exports from the
U.S. displacing the same from competitor countries deserves mention
here. 33 Similarly, the dairy subsidies in both Canada and the U.S. have
enhanced their global exports. 34 Empirical estimates for Portugal 35 and
28. See David De Meza, Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect? , 19
CANADIAN J. ECON. 347, 347 (1986).
29. See Peter Thomas in der Heiden, Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy Shaping
International Trade and Investment Patterns - Evidence from the Iron and Steel Industry, 18
(Inst. ofE. Asian Studies, Univ. of Duisburg-Essen, Working Paper No. 88, 2011), available
http://www.uni-due.de/in-east/fileadmin/publications/gruen/
at
paper88.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
30. See David Victor, The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES
INITIATIVE
11-13
(2008),
available
at
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/politics_ffs.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
31. See Reforming Energy Subsidies: Opportunities to Contribute to the Climate Change
Agenda,
UNITED
NATIONS
ENV'T
PROGRAMME
(2008),
available
at
http://www. unep. org/pdf/pressreleases/reforming_energy_subsidies. pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
32. See Bernard Hoekman, Francis Ng & Marcelo Olarreaga, The Impact ofAgricultural
Support Policies on Developing Countries, in I REFORMING AGRICULTURAL TRADE FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: KEY ISSUES FOR A PRO-DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME OF THE DOHA
ROUND 100, 100-31 (Alex F. McCalla & John Nash eds., 2007).
33. See generally H. G. Brooks, S. Devadoss & W. H. Meyers, The Impact of the US.
Wheat Export Enhancement Program on the World Wheat Market, 38 CANADIAN J. AGRIC.
ECON. 253 (1990).
34. See Kenneth W. Bailey, Comparison of the US. and Canadian Dairy Industries
(The Pa. State. Univ. Dep't of Agric. Econ. & Rural Soc'y, Staff Paper No. 349, 2002),
available at http://www.agmrc.org/media/cms/staffpaper349_ 42eab l 6a91 e4f.pdf (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014).
35. See Oscar Afonso & Armando Silva, Non-Scale Endogenous Growth Effects of
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West Germany36 also confirm the positive relationship between subsidies
and exports.
The positive relationship between subsidies and exports has been
observed in several developing and emerging countries as well. In South
Korea, the implementation of a preferential tax system and subsidy
allocation for export activities led to a transformation of the export basket
of the country towards more value-added manufacturing products. 37 The
massive export growth in China has caused researchers to focus on its
subsidy policy as an explanatory variable. The firm-level panel
estimation results show that production subsidies facilitate exports, and
the effect is more evident for profit-making firms as well as capitalintensive industries. 38
The influence of subsidies on Chinese
manufacturing exports has been established under heterogeneous firm
structure as well. 39 In addition to macro-level analysis, panel data
regressions with Chinese provincial data reveal the strong influence of
subsidies on state owned enterprises ("SO Es") exports, as the government
financial devolution helps them to overcome the high production costs. 40
In the Malaysian context, the positive long-run relationship between
subsidies and exports has been confirmed through a cointegration test. 41
Interestingly, while the positive influence of firm-specific subsidies on
exports in Colombia has been observed, the impact is found to be
diminishing in subsidy size. 42
Nevertheless, a section of the literature questions the influence of
export subsidies, in particular their quantum, on exports. 43 In the East
German context, no relationship between subsidies and exports has been
Subsidies for Exporters, 29 ECON. MODELLING 1248 (2012), available at
http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2012/Programme/Papers/32.pdf (last visited on Nov. 14, 2014).
36. See Sourafel Girma, Holger Gorg & Joachim Wagner, Subsidies and Exports in
Germany: First Evidence from Enterprise Panel Data, 55 APPLIED ECON. Q. 179 (2009).
37. See Wontack Hong, Export-Oriented Growth and Trade Patterns of Korea, in
TRADE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN PACIFIC ASIA 273, 273-306 (Colin J. Bradford, Jr. &
William H. Branson eds., 1987).
38. See Surafel Girma et al., Can Production Subsidies Explain China's Export
Performance? Evidence from Firm-level Data, 111 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 863 (2009).
39. See Fabrice Defever & Alejandro Riaflo, China's Pure Exporter Subsidies (Ctr. for
Econ. Performance, London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Working Paper No. 1182, 2012),
available at http://cep.lse.ac. uk/pubs/download/dp 1182. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
40. See generally Richard S. Eckaus, China's Exports, Subsidies to State Owned
Enterprises and the WTO, 17 CHINA ECON. Rev. 1 (2006).
41. See Bakri Abdul Karim & Shazali Abu Mansor, Subsidy and Export: Malaysian
Case, sec. 4 (Dec. 6, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/37025/1/MPRA_paper_37025.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
42. See Christian Helmers & Natalia Trofimenko, The Use and Abuse of Export
Subsidies: Evidence from Colombia, 36 WORLD ECON. 465, 481-83 (2013).
43. See Girma, Gorg & Wagner supra note 36, at 2.
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established. 44 The weak influence of export subsidies on exports has been
confirmed in Turkey45 and Japan46 as well. Empirical estimates with
respect to U.S. firms have also revealed that the effect of subsidies on
exports is not statistically significant. 47 Similarly, the firm-specific
analysis on the interrelationship between subsidies and export decisions
in Ireland fails to find any significant relationship between the two. 48
Adoption of export subsidies has turned out to be a suboptimal policy
instrument in Latin American countries like Argentina, Mexico 49 and
Costa Rica as well. 50
The absence of statistically significant relationship between
subsidies and exports in several developing countries and least developed
countries ("LDCs") can be explained by the poor implementation
performance by the national governments. Kenya had been a prominent
example of this phenomenon. 51 The underlying reason of the failure to
promote exports even after adopting the subsidization strategy in Bolivia
has been accorded to the decision of non-discretionary implementation of
the policy. Conversely, Korea and Brazil have succeeded in their attempt
by following a path of discretion and selectivity. 52

III. EXPLORING THE REFLECTION OF TRADE THEORY
PREDICTIONS INTO THE WTO REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The existing literature notes the possibility of trade diversion from
efficient producers due to an export-oriented focus and other forms of
subsidies received by their competitors, which may lead to subsidy and

44. See id. at 7.
45. See Ismail Arslan & Sweder van Wijnbergen, Export Incentives, Exchange Rate
Policy and Export Growth in Turkey, 75 Rev. ECON. & STAT. 128, 132 (1993).
46. See Hiroshi Ohashi, Learning by Doing, Export Subsidies, and Industry Growth:
Japanese Steel in the 1950s and 1960s, 66 INT'L ECON. 297, 319 (2005).
47. See Andrew B. Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen, Why Some Firms Export, 86 Rev.
ECON. & STAT. 561, 569 (2004).
48. See Holger Gorg, Michael Henry & Eric Strobl, Grant Support and Exporting
Activity, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 168, 173 (2008).
49. See Julio Nogues, The Experience ofLatin America with Export Subsidies, 126 Rev.
WORLD ECON. (WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV) 97, 104-05 (1990).
50. See generally Alexander Hoffinaister, The Cost of Export Subsidies: Evidence from
Costa Rica, 39 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 1, 138 (1992).
51. See Patrick Low, Export Subsidies and Trade Policy: The Experience of Kenya, 10
WORLD DEV. 293, 302 (1982).
52. See Dani Rodrick, Taking Trade Policy Seriously: Export Subsidization as a Case
Study in Policy Effectiveness, (Nat'] Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4567,
Dec. 1993), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w4567 .pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
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countervailing duty wars for reversing that advantage. 53 Such subsidies
are specific and different from general payments, such as social security
related expenses to which the public at large or large segments of the
population are entitled. On one hand, they can improve the returns to
domestic producers, but on the other hand, they can distort trade. 54 The
additional concern here comes from the fact that the developing country
and LDCs firms do not receive the same level of supports received by
their developed country counterparts, which significantly constrain their
market access both in home and foreign markets. 55 This is reflected in
the negotiations and the text of the ASCM. 56 The compromise at the heart
of the WTO regulation of subsidies resulted in an agreement which
required the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") to clarify a number
of concepts in the case law. Export subsidies are indeed quite susceptible
to abuse. 57
A. The Policy and the Law
The evolution on subsidy regulation in international trade system
started with the Havana Charter, which became the basis for future
agreements on subsidies, such as: the GATT, Subsidies Code of the
Tokyo Round and the ASCM of the Uruguay Round. 58 The ASCM
Agreement defines the term 'subsidy' in detail in Article 1. 59 Moreover,
it classifies subsidies into three broad categories: i) prohibited; ii)

53. See generally KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2002); see Renee Sharp & UssifR. Sumaila, Quantification of the
US. Marine Fisheries Subsidies, 29 N. AMER. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 18 (2009); Anne Tallontire,

Trade Issues on Background Paper: The Impact ofSubsidies on Trade in Fisheries Products,
(Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Project Paper No. 26109, July 2004); Donald J.
Boudreaux, Do Subsidies Justify Retaliatory Protectionism?, 31 ECON. AFF. 4 (2011).
54. The striking example of trade distorting subsidies, the upland cotton subsidies
granted by US government for local farmers which had more adverse consequences away
from its shores. The efforts of rural farmers in developing countries are being undermined by
these subsidies. However, econometric findings have questioned the compensation judgment
of WTO in Brazil's favor. For details see Kilungu Nzaku, Matt Vining & Jack E. Houston,
US. Cotton Subsidies: Are Brazil 's Accusations True? (presented at S. Agric. Econ. Ass'n
Annual
Meeting,
No.
6749,
(2008)
available
at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/6749/2/sp08nzl 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
55. See generally Erich Supper, Is There Effectively A Level Playing Field For
Developing Country Exports?, U.N. Sales No. E-00-11-0-22 (2001).
56. See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WORLD TRADE
ORO., available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf (last visited Nov.
13 2014).
57. See Nogues, supra note 49, at 112.
58. See Chakraborty, Chaisse & Kumar, supra note 20, at 204.
59. See Gary N. Horlick & Peggy A. Clarke, The 1994 WTO Subsidies Agreement, 17
WORLD COMPETITION 41, 42 ( 1993 ).
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actionable; and iii) non-actionable subsidies. 60 This categorisation is
sometimes referred to as a 'traffic light' approach. Prohibited subsidies
are "red light" subsidies, which are harmful to trade per se. 61 Nonactionable subsidies are "green light" subsidies, which are considered to
be permitted on the grounds of an explicit reference in the legal text. 62
Lastly, actionable subsidies are "yellow light" subsidies, which are open
to be challenged only if they are considered to cause adverse effects on
international trade. 63
In the present ASCM, some uncertainties remain as to the meaning
and legal implications of some basic concepts. In this connection, the
ASCM architecture has been challenged at times from the perspective of
efficiency. The lack of purpose in the agreement itself has come under
heavy criticism on the ground that the countries may be forced to remove
socially beneficial subsidies as well. 64 In particular, the sensitivity of the
agreement with economic considerations is strongly questioned. 65
Questions have also been raised on the optimality of disciplining
subsidies beyond the non-violation doctrine. 66 In addition, it is held that
WTO' s subsidy rules would have yielded greater result only after
substantial tariff reductions under GATT. 67
60. Hyung-Jin Kim, Reflections on the Green Light Subsidy for Environmental
Purposes, 3 3 J. WORLD TRADE 167, 167 (1999).
61. Id.
62. Id. This category unfortunately was applied only for a period of five years beginning
with the entry into force of the WTO, since developing countries were afraid it would be
excessively used by industrialized countries. Today efforts are under way to put it back, as
the category is important for the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs")
in developing countries as well. See id.
63. Id. The definition of a subsidy within the meaning of Articles l and 3 of the SCM
Agreement (prohibited subsidies) was addressed by the Appellate Body in various cases, most
prominently in US - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations' (WT/DS108/AB/R), as
well as in Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (WT/DS139/AB/R,
WT/DS142/AB/R 994). See Appellate Body Report Canada, Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R 994 (May 31, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_ e/dispu_ e/2823d.pdf; Appellate Body Report, United
States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations ", WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14,
2002),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
108abrw_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
64. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Will International Rules on Subsidies
Disrupt the World Trading System?, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 877 (2006).
65. See generally PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, PATRICK A. MESSERLIN & JASPER M.
w AUTERS, THE LA w AND ECONOMICS OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN THE WTO (Edward
Elgar Publ'g 2008).
66. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, James Kowal & Patricia Kowal, The Questionable
Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 475, 473523 (2010).
67. See David R. DeRemer, The Evolution of International Subsidy Rules, (Universite
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Hence, in recent period international trade governance has been
characterised by a progressive regulation on subsidies, tightening
disciplines over time in order to avoid such distortions. These rules
essentially seek to balance the need for redistribution and implementation
of legitimate policy goals and to avoid protectionism and unnecessary
distortions of conditions of competition on domestic markets. Traderestrictive border measures apply to countervail unlawful subsidies but
are not at the heart of legal rules relating to this important field of
international trade law.
It is argued that the subsidies are often sector-specific and their
"narrowly tailored" nature, as well as government legal arrangements
pertaining to data dissemination, may prohibit circulation of full
information on them in the public domain. 68 The problem gets further
compounded in case of the indirect subsidies (i.e., income foregone rather
than budgetary transfers). The subsidies data reporting also suffers from
a "forum bias", as several countries have reported relatively higher
fisheries subsidies figures to the OECD and APEC as compared to the
corresponding figures reported to WTO. 69 This kind of massive underreporting makes 'disciplining' of subsidies through the multilateral
negotiations all the more difficult. 70

B. The Practice of Countervailing Duty 71
The alleged continuation of subsidies in foreign countries have often
led countries to take recourse to trade remedial measures. In order to
Libre de Bruxelles: ECARES, Working Paper No. 2013-45, 2013), available at
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/153041 /1/2013-45-DEREMERtheevolution.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014 ).
68. Government Subsidies: Revealing the Hidden Budget, PEW ECON. PoL'Y GROUP
(2013 ),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/
pcs_ assets/2013/Subsidyscope20Framing20Paperpdf.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
69. Hard Facts, Hidden Problems: A Review of Current Data on Fishing Subsidies,
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (2001); see Ussif Rashid Sumalia et al., Catching More Bait: A
Bottom-up Re-estimation of Global Fisheries Subsidies, 12 J. BIOECONOMICS 201, 201-25
(2010).
70. See Exploring the Links Between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO, WORLD TRADE
0RG.
(2006),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_ e/booksp_ e/anrep_ e/world _trade_report06_ e.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2014).
71. The analysis undertaken in this section draws from the methodology developed by
Chaisse and Chakraborty (2007) and Chakraborty and Khan (2008). See Julien Chaisse &
Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The
Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 153 (2007); see also DEBASHIS CHAKRABORTY & AMIR ULLAH KHAN, THE WTO
DEADLOCKED: UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Los Angeles and
London: Sage Publications 2008).
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further the analysis, we constructed Figure 1 in which all countervailing
duty investigations initiated from 1995 to 2013 have been reported.
Figure 1: Countervailing Duty Investigations Initiated from 1995 to
2013 (December), Worldwide
45

-

Initiations
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-

Measures
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Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database

Figure 1 allows us to observe that the number of global
Countervailing Duty ("CVD") initiations and CVD measures in response
to subsidies has shown a fluctuating trend during 1995-2013. The
number of CVD initiations exhibited a continuous increasing trend from
1996 to 1999 and was at its peak in 1999 with 41 initiations during that
year. Since 1999 however a cyclical pattern is being observed. The
scenario improved considerably in 2005, when the number of initiations
reached a minimum of 6. However, SCM initiations have increased ever
since and reached 28 and 25 initiations during 2009 and 2011
respectively. The trend indicates that CVD activism has been influenced
strongly by the global recession, with increase in initiation incidence
during crisis years. However, the sharp rise in CVD initiations during
2013 indicates grievances among countries, which causes serious
concern. The imposition of CVD measures has also shown a similar
cyclical pattern. While an increasing trend has been observed in CVD
measures during 1996-2000, an overall decreasing trend was noticed
during 2001-2007 with minor fluctuations. However, the number of
measures increased to 11 in 2008 and further to 19 in 2010. The CVD
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/3
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measures, like initiations, have also shown an increasing trend during
2013.
In order to understand the SCM imposing behavior of the major
trading countries with respect to each other during the period of January
1, 1995 to December 31, 2013, Table 1 has been constructed from WTO
data. While the countries facing the SCM measures are noted row-wise,
the countries initiating the same are reported column-wise. A total of335
SCM actions have been cumulatively initiated during this period. The
United States (U.S.) topped the list by accounting for 41.19% of the total
CVD initiations, followed by the EU (21.49%). Interestingly, a
significant proportion of the initiations made by the U.S. have taken place
against major Asian economies like China (28.26%) and India (12.32%).
On the other hand, only 15 SCM initiations has been undertaken against
the U.S, of which 3 were initiated by Canada and the EU each and 4 by
China.
A similar trend has been noticed in case of the EU as well. Among
the 72 SCM cases initiated, 27.78% of the total number of cases has been
lodged against India. The other countries suffering from the EU SCM
initiations include China (11.11 %), South Korea (9.72%) and Taiwan
(8.33%), where the last two countries are not reported in the table. On
the contrary, the EU has faced only 14 initiations on SCM ground against
its exports. The lower SCM activism against the EU or U.S. can hardly
be considered as evidence signifying lesser devolution of subsidies within
their territories.
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Table 1: Subsidy and Countervailing Duty Initiation and
Measure Matrix for Major Countries (1.1.95 - 31.12.13)

0

0

3

0

0

':'.:i

-

-

'R>

-

-::3

.a.

.:,.,

.a.

'tit

Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database

* - the figures in the parenthesis show the final measures.
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Looking at the other end of the spectrum, it is observed that China
presently tops the list of the countries suffering from the SCM initiations
(22.69% of the total cumulative initiations), followed by India (18.21 %)
and South Korea (5.97%) (not shown in Table 1). Canada, the EU and
the U.S. jointly initiated 85.53% and 70.49% of all the SCM initiations
against China and India respectively. However, other developing
countries like South Africa have also targeted Indian exports on SCM
grounds. On the whole an interesting picture emerges from the analysis;
while Canada, the EU and the U.S. account for 73.73% of all SCM
initiations, China, India and South Korea account for 46.87% of the
affected cases. If Indonesia and Thailand are also added to the list of the
affected developing countries, the corresponding figure reaches 56.12%.
Clearly the low cost economies of Asia are emerging as the major targets
of SCM activism in leading developed countries.
The SCM measures are reported in the parenthesis of the same table
and a similar conclusion emerges from the analysis. The calculations
reveal that Canada, the EU and the U.S. jointly account for 71.58% of all
SCM measures during the study period. On the other hand, among the
target economies, China, India and South Korea account for 50.00% of
the total SCM measures.
The finding underlines the need to have a closer analysis of the SCM
activism followed by Canada, the EU and the U.S., which is reported at
Harmonized System ("HS") sectional level in Table 2. Section XV,
which consists of Base Metals and articles of Base Metals, is found to
attract most of the SCM initiations for these three players. It deserves
mention that the sector is the recipient of subsidies in several countries,
especially fuel subsidies. The triad has jointly initiated 89 .31 % of the
total SCM initiations and 82.42% of the total measures in this sector. The
SCM activism for base metals is particularly high in the U.S. The other
major sectors facing SCM challenges in the triad include low-tech
products in Section VII (Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber and articles
thereof), Section Vl (Products of Chemical or allied industries) and
Section IV (prepared foodstuff, etc.). However, a relatively sophisticated
product group like machinery and electrical appliances (Section XVI) has
also been subject to SCM actions. While the EU has adopted several
SCM actions on plastic and rubber products and textile products, U.S.
actions on chemical products are significant.
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Table 2: Canadian, EU and U.S. Countervailing Initiations I
Measures by Product Type - A Comparative Analysis (1.1.95 31.12.13)*

Live Animals; Animal Products
Vegetable Products
Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages,
Spirits and Vinegar; Tobacco and
Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes
Mineral Products
Products of the Chemical or Allied
Industries
Plastics and Articles Thereof;
Rubber and Articles Thereof
Wood and Articles of Wood;
Wood Charcoal; Cork and Articles
of Cork; Manufactures of Straw, of
Esparto or of Other Plaiting
Materials; Basketware and
Wickerwork
Pulp Of Wood or of Other Fibrous
Cellulosic Material; Recovered
(Waste and Scrap) Paper or
Paperboard; Paper and Paperboard
and Articles Thereof

3 (1)
0

0

l (1)

0

Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and
Associated Transport E uipment
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8 (5
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0

0
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28 (20)

70
45

Textiles and Textile Articles
Footwear, head ear etc.
Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement,
Asbestos, Mica or Similar
Materials; Ceramic Products;
Glass and Glassware
Base Metals and Articles of Base
Metal
Machinery and Mechanical
Appliances; Electrical Equipment;
Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders
and Reproducers, Television
Image and Sound Recorders and
Reproducers, and Parts and
Accessories of Such Articles

0

0

1
0
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Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database

* - the figures in the parenthesis show the final measures.
Table 3 looks at the other side of the coin, i.e., the distribution of
the sectors affected by SCM actions in exporting countries. Six entities,
namely, Brazil, China, EU, India, Indonesia and South Korea are
considered here for the analysis. China and India have been affected most
by SCM actions and in both cases a major proportion of the initiations
have been related to Section XV (Base Metal and articles of Base Metal).
The other affected sectors include Section VI (Products of Chemical or
allied industries) and Section VII (Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber
and articles thereof). It is observed from the data that the base metal
sector in Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea are also suffering heavily
from the SCM initiations and measures in manufacturing products.
Interestingly, the EU has faced no SCM initiation or measure against its
base metal products, but rather witnessed initiations against its Section
III (Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils) and Section IV (Prepared
Foodstuffs) exports. The emerging difference can be explained in line
with the subsidy provisions under Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP").
Despite the fact that more than half a century have passed since
trading countries started discussions on subsidies issue since the Havana
Charter in order to regulate their misuse, there exists ample room for
further development. The number of SCM related cases demonstrates
that the consequences of granting of subsidies by a government could
have serious repercussions on international trade. The DSB of WTO has
so far played a significant role in curbing the adverse effects of subsidies
on foreign countries. For instance, "successive appeals by the European
Union, the United States and other member countries at the WTO has
forced China to scrap several export support programs and preferential
treatment for its exporters. " 72 The proven WTO incompatibility of the
U.S. system for taxing foreign export earnings 73 and modifications in
Export Credit Guarantee Program for Cotton74 in light ofDSB ruling also
72. See Fabrice Defever & Alejandro Riano, China's Pure Exporter Subsidies, 1182
CENTRE FOR ECON. PERFORMANCE 1, 5 (2012).
73. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Foreign Sales Corporation Drama: Reaching the
Last Act?, PETERSON INST. FOR lNT'L ECON., No. PB02-10 (2002), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb02-1 O.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
74. See John Baffes, Cotton Subsidies, the WTO, and the 'Cotton Problem', 34 WORLD
ECON. 1534 (2011).
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deserve mention. This scenario demonstrates the necessity to improve
the existing regulations on subsidies at the multilateral level.

Table 3: Countervailing Measures by Product Type - A
Comparative Analysis of Major Affected Countries (1.1.95 31.12.13)
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Cleavage
Products etc.;
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* - the figures in the parenthesis show the final measures.

IV. REJUVENATING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The influence of government subsidies on export performance is
estimated here for 140 countries over 1990-2011. Subsidies included in
the present analysis include only direct budgetary transfers reported by
the government of a country. The indirect or implicit subsidies (i.e.,
income foregone in terms of tax rebate, fuel subsidy etc.) are not included
in the analysis due to non-availability of consistent cross-country data.
The current analysis considers subsidies provided by a country expressed
as percentage of its GDP for ensuring comparability of data across
countries, which is accessed from Government Finance Statistics
("GFS") ofIMF. 75
A. The Economic Data

As per the GFS Manual of 2001, the IMF reported data on subsidies
are:
[C]urrent transfers that government units pay to enterprises either on
75. See generally Government Finance Statistics, IMF ELIBRARY- DATA (2013),
available at http://elibrary-data.imf.org/DataExplorer.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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the basis of the levels of their production activities or on the basis of the
quantities or values of the goods or services that they produce, sell, or
import. Included are transfers to public corporations and other
enterprises that are intended to compensate for operating losses. 76

Clearly, such subsidies can include actionable transfers and may
significantly influence exports. Moreover, even de-linked subsidies,
which are provided solely based on domestic considerations, rather than
external motivations, may end up providing export boost through indirect
effects.
It is observed that GFS compiles the government subsidy figures for
countries from different government sources as per their reporting
practice. 77 Three types of government reporting have been observed in
the GFS data. 78 First, the General Government ("GG") includes all the
Central Government ("CG") transfers plus budgetary expenses of all the
Central Ministries I Departments and the same for the State Governments
("SG") (including provincial or regional) and Local Governments. 79 The
Central Government ("CG") transfers on the other hand represent the
consolidated transfers of the Central Government (including transfers of
Central Ministries I departments). 80 Finally, subsidies reported under
Budgetary Central Government ("BCG") covers, "[a ]ny central
government entity that is fully covered by the central government
budget. " 81 In addition, the GFS generally reports the budgetary statistics
for countries adopting cash accounting standards, but for several
countries, accrual (non-cash) accounting standards for extra-budgetary
units and social security funds has been reported. In order to understand
the differential effects of the data reporting differences, suitable dummy
variables have been included in the empirical model.
76Government Finance Statistics Manual, IMF 40 (2001), available at
https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/pdf/all.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
77. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material:
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, IMF (2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/intbin.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); see
generally Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75.
78. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material:
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4; see generally
Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75.
79. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material:
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4; see generally
Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75.
80. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material:
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4; see generally
Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75.
81. Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material: Instructions
for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4.
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Several control variables, e.g., the per capita income of the
countries, the share of agriculture, industry and services in their
economies, merchandise imports, inward foreign direct investment
("FDI") stock and political freedom, are included in the analysis in line
with existing literature. With the growing size of the economy, the
relative importance of trade is expected to decrease. Furthermore, the
contribution of various sectors to GDP may show interesting dynamics
with exports in the presence of subsidies in the model. Inward FDI stock
is generally favorable for enhancing exports from the recipient country. 82
In addition, merchandise imports (both raw materials and semi-processed
products) can boost exports of a country. 83 Finally, political freedom
leads to economic efficiency, which in tum may enhance exports. 84
Gross GDP figures in current prices and current exchange rates are
obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCT AD") Statistics. Merchandise exports and imports in a country
are considered in the current analysis by expressing them as a percentage
of its GDP, where all variables (at level) are measured in U.S. Dollars at
current prices and current exchange rates in millions. The same data is
accessed from UNCTAD Statistics as well. 85 The share of the three
sectors in GDP of a country has been obtained from World Development
Indicators ("WD I") database of the World Bank. 86 The data on political
freedom is obtained from Freedom House, where the country scores
range over 1 to 7 (where 1 represents the highest and 7 the lowest level
of freedom). 87
82. See Tadashi Ito, Export Platform Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence,
378 INST. DEVELOPrNG ECON. 4 (Dec. 2012).
83. See Tahir Mukhtar & Sarwat Rasheed, Testing Long Run Relationship Between
Exports and Imports: Evidence from Pakistan, 31 J. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 41, 41-42
(2010); see generally Biswajit Ng & Jaydeep Mukherjee, The Sustainability a/Trade Deficits
in the Presence of Endogenous Structural Breaks: Evidence from the Indian Economy, 23 J.
ASIAN ECON. 519, 519-26 (2012); see generally Ramona Dumitru et al., Analysis of the
Relationship between the Romanian Exports and Imports, 8 ANNALS UNIV. PETROSANI
ECON. 177, 177-82 (2008).
84. See Andre Liebenberg, The Relationship Between Economic Freedom, Political
Freedom and Economic Growth (Nov. 7, 2012) (M.B.A. thesis, Gordon Inst. of Bus. Science,
Univ. of Pretoria), available at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-02232013123 734/unrestricted/dissertation. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
85. See generally UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., available at
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (to
access data used).
86. See generally World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, available at
http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/WDiandGDF excel.zip (last visited Nov.
16, 2014).
87. The country scores can be accessed using Freedom House's Index of Democracy.
See
Freedom
in
the
World,
FREEDOM
HOUSE
(2014),
available
at
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In addition, the analysis incorporates a number of constructed
dummy variables (e.g. country type dummies, financial system reporting
dummies, a dummy for the year 1999 and the year dummies) to capture
their effects on the proposed relationship. However, to avoid perfect
multicollinearity, only any two of the government dummies (GG, CG and
BCG) have been simultaneously used at a time in the estimated models.
Similarly, cash and non-cash dummies have not been used in the
regression models together. To understand the export implications of
subsidies in countries situated at different levels of economic
achievements, four country group dummies are considered separately in
the model on the basis of Per Capita Gross National Income ("PCGNI",
atlas method, in current U.S. dollars). The four country groups are as
follows: low-income economies ("LIE") (PCGNI: US $1,005 or less),
lower-middle-income economies ("LMIE") (PCGNI: US $1,006-3,975),
upper-middle-income economies ("UMIE") (PCGNI US $3,976-12,275)
and high-income economies ("HIE") (PCGNI US $12,276 or more). 88 To
avoid perfect multicollinearity, UMIE was dropped from the analysis.
B. The Macro Trends

The macro scenario in the two key series considered in the current
analysis, namely, budgetary subsidies and merchandise exports, are
illustrated with the help of Figures 2-4. The time period is divided into
four equal segments for understanding the temporal perspective. It is
observed from Figure 2 that the average allocation ofbudgetary subsidies
(expressed as percentage of GDP) has understandably been higher in
UMIE and HIE countries as compared to their LIE and LMIE
counterparts during all four periods reported in the diagram. The average
subsidy figure in 1995-2000 declined vis-a-vis the corresponding 19901995 figures, but the same increased both during 2001-2005 and 20062011 as compared to the preceding periods. In addition, the gap between
the two groups of economies has widened during 2006-11.

http://www. freedomhouse. org/report-types/freedom-world#.VDr7 OmRdWi2 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014).
88. Income brackets are in line with the World Bank classification. See Data-Countries
and Economies, WORLD BANK (2014), available at http://data.worldbank.org/country (last
visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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Figure 2: Subsidy Scenario in Countries Under Different Income
Group
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An annual time trend reported in Figure 3 reveals that from 1999
onwards, the average subsidy devolution in proportional terms has
intensified in the developed countries (HIE and UMIE). A similar
upward trend is noted in their relatively poorer counterparts (LIE and
LMIE) from 2000 onwards. The trend line drawn for both series (not
shown in figure) reveals a clear upward trend from 1999 onwards, as a
result of which a 1999 year dummy ( 1 for year 1999 onwards, 0 for
others) has been incorporated in the regression models. Another
important observation from the figure is that for both developed and
developing countries alike, budgetary transfers (as % of GDP) increased
in the face of recession (2008). Though the size of the bailout package
was larger for developed countries, increase in budgetary transfers for
developing countries also increased substantially. Nevertheless, given
budgetary constraints, the withdrawal of special package for recession
was faster for developing countries from 2009 onwards.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/3
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Figure 3: Time Trend in Subsidy Figures Across Country
Groups by Income
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Figure 4 reveals the average merchandise export scenario
(expressed as percentage of GDP) for the two groups of countries. The
exports have increased for UMIE and HIEs for all the four periods.
However, there has been a marginal decline in proportional importance
of exports for LIE and LMIEs during the last period, 2006-2011. The
proportional importance of exports in GDP has been higher in UMIE and
HIEs as compared to their LIE and LMIE counterparts during all four
periods reported in the diagram.
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Figure 4: Merchandise Export Scenario in Countries Under
Different Income Group
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Finally, Table 4 illustrates the data availability for the present
analysis as per the government data reporting practices (i.e., GG, CG or
BCG). The first three columns segregate the total observations as per the
cash and non-cash (accrual) reporting practices, while the next three
columns summarize the average subsidy scenario (as percentage of GDP)
as per the country groupings. The last three columns represent the
average export figures expressed as percentage of GDP. It is observed
that the subsidies and export inclination figures are generally higher for
countries reporting GG data as compared to corresponding ones
following CG and BCG reporting practices, barring the exception of
UMIE and HIE countries in case ofBCG data on average subsidy.
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Table 4: Description of Data by Availability

Noncash

Tota

UMI
E&

LIE
&

UMI
E&

1

HIE

All

LMIE

HIE

All

309

554

863

1.68

1.64

1.65

28.35

36.01

33.85

659

37

696

1.28

1.56

1.40

26.94

34.04

30.00

508

102

610

1.12

2.28

1.47

22.85

33.59

26.13

1.31
1.73
1.52 24.88 34.72 29.10
693 2169
Source: prepared by the authors from the constructed dataset

V. RUNNING THE EMPIRICAL TESTS
Currently, the WTO member countries are engaged in multilateral
negotiation so as to limit the usage of actionable subsidies in international
trade, which needs to draw from empirical findings on this front. A crosscountry empirical analysis is undertaken next for understanding the
influence of budgetary subsidies on export inclination. First, the
regression model is explained, while the empirical results are
subsequently presented.
A. Empirical Model for the Cross-Country Empirical Analysis
The following panel data regression model is estimated here in order
to analyze the effect of subsidies on export performance. The advantage
of using the log-linear model in the current context is that the estimated
coefficients can be interpreted as the elasticity between budgetary
subsidy and exports.
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LMERXit= a + B LPCGDPit+B2LPCGDPit2+ B3LSUBSID Yit+ B4
LMERMit+/J5LGDPINDit+ B6LGDPSERit+ B7LGDPAGRIit+ B8
LFDIINSTKit+ B9LFHIPRit+ GOVDUM + Non-Cash +
Duml 999 + Tt + Eit......... .. (1)
where,

a

represents the constant term

Bs

are coefficients

LMERXit

represents log of Merchandise Export (expressed as
percentage of GDP) of country i for year t
represents log of Per Capita Gross Domestic Product
LPCGDPit
(PPP, current international $) of country i for year t
represents
log ofbudgetary subsidy (as percentage of
LSUBSIDYit
GDP) of country i for year t
represents the log of Merchandise Import (expressed as
LMERMit
percentage of GDP) of country i for year t
represents the log of share of industry in GDP
LGDPINDit
(expressed as percentage of GDP) of country i for year t
represents the log of share of services in GDP
LGDPSERit
(expressed as percentage of GDP) of country i for year t
LGDPAGRIit represents the log of share of agriculture and allied
activities in GDP (expressed as percentage of GDP) of
country i for year t
LFDIINSTKit represents the log of inward stock of Foreign Direct
Investment (expressed as percentage of GDP) of country
i for year t
represents the log of Freedom House Index of Political
LFHIPRit
Rights of country i for year t
GOVDUM
represents government dummy, of which
GG represents a dummy for countries, when the
subsidy data is reported by the general
government
CG represents a dummy for countries, when the
subsidy data is reported by the central government
BCG represents a dummy for countries, when the
subsidy data is reported by the budgetary central
government
Cash
represents a dummy when countries practice cash
accounting standards for budgetary reporting
Non-Cash
represents a dummy when countries practice accrual
accounting standards for budgetary reporting
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/3
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Dum1999

Eit

31

is a dummy whose value is O before 1999 and 1 for 1999
onwards
represents the time dummies (i.e., T1=l for 1990 and O
otherwise)
represents the disturbance term
B. Results

A panel data regression analysis has been undertaken here with help
of the STATA software (version 10.1). To understand the working of the
model for the proposed relationship in equation ( 1), a Hausman
specification test is first conducted. It is observed that the Chi-square test
statistic of 125.13 (Prob>chi2: 0.0000) is statistically significant. The
Hausman test suggests the presence of a fixed effect model. Next, we
have conducted a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and
the test statistics is 78.815 (Prob>F: 0.0000), which implies the presence
of autocorrelation of first order. A Breusch-Pagan I Cook-Weisberg test
is conducted next and the test statistic is 109.67 (Prob>chi2: 0.0000),
which points to the presence of heteroskedasticity. The mean Variation
Inflation Factor ("VIF'') is 2.88, which indicates that the variables
included in the model are within the tolerance level of multicollinearity.
Based on these diagnostics, the present analysis estimates Feasible
Generalized Least Square ("FGLS") regressions with time and country
group fixed effects and reports results for equation (1) with
heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation [AR(l)] corrected
coefficients and standard errors in Table 5.
The estimation results summarized in Table 5 clearly indicate the
positive influence of government subsidies on export performance across
country groups. In both the Fixed Effect ("FE") and FGLS regression
models, the coefficient of logarithmic transformation of subsidies is
observed to be positive and significant.
The results indicate that in both lower and higher income countries,
the devolution of subsidies are helping them to promote exports, in line
with the theoretical predictions. The LIE, LMIE and HIE dummies
included in most of the regression models are all found to be positive and
significant, implying that all countries, irrespective of their income levels,
benefit from the provision of subsidies. Interestingly, the coefficient for
the LIE dummy is found to be non-significant in the fixed effect model,
but larger as compared to the corresponding figures for LMIE and HIE
country group dummies under the FGLS models. In addition, the
coefficients of the LMIE dummies are found to be larger than the HIE
dummies. In other words, greater devolution of subsidies in lower
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income group countries leads to greater export growth. The result can be
explained by the structural (e.g., poorer infrastructure, imperfect factor
markets) and operational bottlenecks (e.g., lower margins, scale
disadvantages) prevalent in LDCs and other poorer economies, and
greater devolution of budgetary support can overcome these constraints
and effectively promote exports from their territories. However, the
dummies are found to be statistically non-significant under some model
specifications.

Table 5: Estimation Results on the Relationship Between Subsidy
and Merchandise Exports
Dependent Variable: LMERX

Independent

Variables
Constant

1.4188**
(0.5793)

lpcgdp

-0.1894***
(0.0514)

lpcgdp2

0.8255
(0.6103)
-0.5537***
(0.1478)
0.0395***
(0.0082)

/subsidy

0.01 73***
(0.0048)

lmerm

0.6772***
(0.0304)

lgdpind

0.5435***
(0.0575)

/gdpser

-0.2284***
(0.076)

0.0069*
(0.0036)
0.7222***
(0.01 59)
0.7816***
(0.0425)
-0.2913***
(0.0609)

2.1654***
(0.7556)
-0.3933**
(0.1753)
0.0303***
(0.0096)
0.0093**
(0.0039)
0.7163***
(0.017)
0.5601 ***
(0.0534)

0.6783

0.7779

(0.6282)

(0.6634)

-0.8073***
(0.1456)
0.0509***
(0.0083)
0.0067*
(0.0037)
0.7036***
(0.0168)
0.9097***
(0.0315)

-0.5681 ***

0.0374***
(0.0088)
0.0088**
(0.0037)
0.6768***
(0.0174)
0.7859***
(0.0457)
-0.284***

(0.0778)

lgdpagri

-0.518***
(0.1593)

(0.0636)
-0.025
(0.0156)

lfdiinstk

0.0208**
(0.0092)

ljhipr

0.0436***
(0.0062)

0.0262***
(0.0051)

0.0367***
(0.0061)

0.0415***
(0.0064)
0.0105
(0.0139)
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-0.0692***

cg

(0.0212)

bcg

-0.0529*
(0.0287)

noncash

0.0182
(0.0214)
0.0021

lie

(0.0407)

lmie

0.0611 ***
(0.0233)
0.0472*

hie

(0.0259)
0.1102***

dum/999

0.0201

0.0132

0.0182

0.0188

(0.0138)

(0.0137)

(0.0149)

(0.0139)

-0.0293

-0.0074

-0.0105

-0.0196

(0.0192)

(0.0189)

(0.0197)

(0.0193)

0.0363**
(0.0146)
0.0765***
(0.0295)
0.0451 ***
(0.0157)
0.0352*
(0.019)

0.0638***

0.0246*
(0.0142)
0.0429
(0.0332)
0.0418**

0.0312**
(0.0153)
0.0691 **
(0.0309)
0.0449***

0.027*
(0.0148)
0.0639**
(0.0302)
0.0445***

(0.0164)

(0.0171)

(0.0158)

0.0139

0.023

0.0272

(0.0181)

(0.0187)

(0.019)

0.0598***

0.064***

0.0763***

(0.0397)

(0.0227)

(0.0223)

(0.0244)

(0.0242)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No. ofObs

1792

1788

1573

1773

1764

No. of Grs

139

135

120

134

133

WaldChi2

44.67#

4846.05

3517.11

4194.69

3807.22

0.0000@

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Time Effects

Prob

(Wald chi2)

Notes:# implies F-Stat (instead of Wald chi2 for Model 1)
@ implies Prob (F-Stat) (instead of Prob (Wald chi2) for Modell)

Figure in the parenthesis shows the heteroskedasticity and first order
autocorrelation [AR( 1)] corrected standard error of the estimated coefficient
***,**and* implies estimated coefficient is significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10
level respectively.

Among the control variables, log of per capita GDP of a country is
found to be negatively related with log of export inclination, while the
square term is positively significant. The result implies that the growth
rate of exports declines with rise in growth rate of GDP, which is higher
for the low income countries starting from a lower base. The result is in
line with the coefficient of country dummies and clearly signifies that
higher economic size is more favorable for outward orientation. Log of
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merchandise import ("LMERM") bears a positive coefficient with the
dependent variable, indicating that higher merchandise import growth
rate leads to higher merchandise exports. The relationship can be
explained by the fact that deeper association with integrated production
networks with trade partners lead to higher import of quality raw material
and semi-processed inputs, which contributes to the rise in value-added
final exports.
The independent variable GDPIND is positively related with export
inclination, as generation of greater manufacturing (including mining,
construction, electricity, water supply and gas) output leads to higher
export surplus. Share of agriculture is, however, not significant in any of
the regression models. As per expectation, FDI inward stock variable is
positively related to export inclination, signifying presence of "exportplatform" FDI in the cross-country framework. Finally, political freedom
variable is found to be non-significant, owing to the fact that both
countries characterized by deeper democratic practices (e.g. U.S.) and
more stringent regimes (e.g. China) demonstrate higher export
inclination.
Capturing the influence of the level of government that provides
budgetary subsidy for a particular country is important. Following the
GFS reporting principle, in absence of information on GG budgetary
subsidy for a country, the current analysis considers CG or BCG in the
estimated model. It is observed that in all reported models the coefficient
of both CG and BCG bear a negative sign. The result strongly underlines
the significance of the reported layer of government subsidies on exports,
as CG and BCG subsidies are associated with differential intercept shifts.
The dummies represent the information at a more disaggregated level of
government, which are associated with lesser export inclination. The
coefficient of the non-cash dummy is found to be positive in sign. The
result underlines the importance of the accounting system and implies
that adoption of accrual accounting across the countries is desirable. The
coefficients of both the set of support category dummies strongly indicate
that the layer of government data reporting system and their accounting
technique considerably influence the relationship. The 1999 dummy has
been found to be positive and significant, indicating that subsidy-export
relationship received a boost in the post 1999 period. 89 Finally, the
reported coefficients of the time dummies are also significant.

89. It may be noted that the year 1999 has been marked by the failure of the Seattle
Ministerial meeting of the WTO.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/3

34

Mukherjee et al.: Curtailing Subsidy Wars in Global Trade

2014]

Curtailing Subsidy Wars in Global Trade

35

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: LESSONS FOR THE CURRENT
WTO NEGOTIATIONS
The waves of globalization during the last decade have led to
deepening of international trade flows in general and in manufacturing
products in particular.90 On one hand, the evolving trade dynamics have
created an urge in developing countries and LDCs to enable the domestic
players to enjoy a level-playing field in the international markets and also
to actively attract production-related foreign investment. Provision of
subsidies for augmenting advantages for local players has played a crucial
role in this context. On the other hand, declining competitiveness has
forced their developed counterparts to contemplate continuation of
subsidy policies within their territories. In addition to the direct export
subsidies, the indirect subsidies may also positively influence export
pattern. The empirically observed subsidy-exports interrelationship in
the current analysis needs to be viewed in this wider context.
Firstly, the number of cases in international trade practice
demonstrated that the consequences of granting of subsidies by a
government could have serious adverse effects on international trade.
This situation strongly underlines the necessity to improve the regulation
on subsidies at the multilateral level. Despite the fact that more than half
a century passed since trading countries started negotiations on subsidies
issues, it seems international trade law still have room for further
development. The discussion of the completed disputes on ASCM
indicates that several major provisions of the agreement have been
liberally misused by WTO members by targeting low-cost Asian
countries. As a result, the CVD activism effect has been felt more
seriously by the middle income developing countries and the emerging
economies, who have also witnessed an increasing share of
manufacturing sector in their respective GDP. Therefore, the current
negotiation on rules should attempt to prevent such misuse through
relevant modification of the ASCM text.
In particular, the data reporting practices across countries differ
widely, often providing some economies with the flexibility to hide the
quantum of subsidies devolution to the local players. The negotiation on
fisheries subsidies is a case in point, where such data reporting practices
mismatch largely contributes to the delay in curbing the 'Article 1'
subsidies. Hence, the subsidies data reporting framework of countries
needs to be harmonized. The empirical observations of the current

90. See Julien Chaisse, 'Exploring the Confines of International Investment and
Domestic Health Protections', 39 AM. J. L. AND MED. 332, 332-361 (2013).
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analysis, underlining the importance of data reporting framework in
determining the 'export-effect' of the subsidies, is of crucial policy
relevance in that context.
Secondly, supporting the domestic players through subsidy policy
has been a traditional policy tool adopted by both developed and
developing countries. The developed countries, with their greater
financial strength, has enabled the local players to have an edge vis-a-vis
the foreign players, not only in the domestic market, but also in the third
markets. Such policies have been practiced in Australia, Canada, the EU
and the U.S., i.e., the Quad countries, for a long time. These
developments have motivated several developing and emerging countries
since the 1970s onward to mimic the subsidy-led export success of their
developed counterparts. The empirical results indicate a successful
adoption of the subsidy-led export growth policy in both lower-income
and lower-middle income economies as well.
The empirical results underline that continuing subsidies makes
economic sense from the selfish standpoint of an individual country,
irrespective of its development status. However, given the economic
discrepancy between developed and developing country exports, a
subsidy-based trade war is more likely to put the latter group in a
disadvantageous position vis-a-vis their developed counterparts. In
particular, continuation of subsidy policies in developing countries and
LDCs end up only providing moral justification for the higher SCM
activism in their developed counterparts. The evidence presented from
the base metal sector is a case in point. Moreover, provision of subsidies
create diverging influence on exports of countries belonging to different
income groups, as evident from the significance of the country group
dummy coefficients, adds further to the disadvantages of the poorer
economies. The empirical findings of the current paper therefore
underline the importance of concluding the Doha Round Negotiations of
WTO in general and disciplining subsidies in particular in no uncertain
terms.
"The third major issue that has caused political turmoil in the
negotiations surrounding the Doha Agreement and the post Uruguay
round of talks at the WTO is in the area of export refunds and subsidies.
At Bali, the ministers agreed to ensure export subsidies and other
measures with similar effect are [reduced]." 91 "With no legally binding
91. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, supra note 3; see also Ministerial
Conference of7 December 2013, WT/MIN(l3)/40-WT/L/915 (2013), WORLD TRADE 0RG.,
available
at
http://wto.org/english/thewto e/minist_e/mc9 el
balipackage_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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arrangements, the good will statements are open to abuse and the
disputes' panel of the [WTO] could be just as busy as it has been with
countries arguing over subsidies and tariffs and quotas as much as they
have over the last [two decades] ." 92 "The fact that the U.S. has opted out
of the tariff quota arrangements also forewarns of arguments and trouble
and it appears that the current trend for bilateral negotiations for free trade
agreements will be the route forward and the work in the WT0." 93

92. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, supra note 3.
93 . Id.
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